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Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Catalyzing Change: Is It Society or Technology? Review of Innovations in Sustainable Consumption

Ethan Goffman

Given social inertia and pockets of resistance, how do we get to sustainability? Why is it not possible to simply invent the technology, quantify the lifestyle changes necessary, and be on our way? Why do humans so stubbornly resist change? A new book, Innovations in Sustainable Consumption, explores these questions using three theoretical umbrellas: the so-called “new economics,” socio-technical transitions theory, and social practice theory. (Full disclosure: Maurie Cohen, one of the volume’s editors, is also the SSPP Blog editor, and the book came out of a conference sponsored by the Sustainable Consumption Research and Action Initiative (SCORAI), with which I am affiliated.) The social path to sustainability is complicated, amorphous, and ever-shifting, like some huge beast that refuses to be comprehended by any one perspective. Thus, the editors’ introduction admits that each theoretical perspective for change “has its strengths and weaknesses, but jointly there is potential that they might provide useful” ways forward for understanding and policy.

What some scholars and practitioners have dubbed the new economics adds a broader social perspective to ecological economics, which considers the human economy as a subset of the biophysical environment. Because the new economics encompasses both social and technological change, it is a wise choice to open the volume. The section begins, however, with a discussion, by Jonathan Harrison, of the old economics, specifically John Maynard Keynes’ argument that, when capitalism fails, government investments are needed to restore confidence to the economy. As confidence improves, capitalism returns to its normal functioning. At the heart of Keynesianism is a continuing growth paradigm. Ecological economists, by contrast, believe that growth itself is no longer tenable given environmental constraints, but that current development is enough to sustain humanity. Harris tries to harmonize the two positions, arguing that a “green Keynesianism” can be adopted, roughly through 2050, followed by a steady state economics. For Harris, if used to stimulate only green projects—for instance wind farms instead of coal plants—Keynesian growth can be decoupled from environmental harm. While I agree that a burst of “green Keynesianism” is necessary to end the worldwide recession and to move to environmentally friendly technology, I do not understand the 2050 transition date. If one must set such a date, 2020 is more realistic, or even 2015. Actually, though, I do not think we have the space for a separate transition to a steady state economy. That transition must begin today (actually ten years ago, or even fifty years ago), and must include such factors as smaller houses, transit-oriented development, and greatly reduced meat consumption, although it may work best parallel to a temporary green Keynesianism.

The rest of the contributors to the economics section are more skeptical of Keynes. Inge Röpke argues that schemes such as green Keynesianism do “not question the need for classic economic growth…biophysical limits are not acknowledged and the need for global redistribution is not addressed.” She also discusses some of the possibilities of localism and an informal economy, as well as its drawbacks (basically, a loss of economy of scale). John Stutz adds to a chorus of voices calling for shrinking working hours as productivity increases, and suggests that incessant growth stops delivering benefits to the average family, that “living agreeably and well” is “the appropriate objective for an affluent society” (as Keynes pointed out in some of his work).

Emanuel Ubert and Michael Bell argue that the need for businesses to pay employees as little as possible—undercutting their ability to consume—conflicts with the need for consumers (who are also employees) to buy as much as possible. Credit fills the gap, but is eventually unable to sustain itself, as we have recently seen with the housing bubble. Capitalism by its very nature thus faces recurrent crises. While Ubert and Bell’s analysis of the problem is more cogent than their solutions (not surprising in a short essay), they seem to believe that a sustainable economy will resolve this contradiction by ending growth and thus help the environment at the same time. Alas, I am not certain how—the new economics seems to me still utopian, though perhaps it will increasingly take shape in the future. Not that there is any question we need a transformation, but the way forward is murky.

Green Keynesianism calls for widespread technological change, but this is not possible without great social change. People must accept the new technology and use it efficiently. Socio-technical transition theory asks what leads to the widespread adoption of a new technology, such as the steam engine or the automobile. The problem is not just technological; as the name implies, social change is also needed. Thus, instead of a brilliant technological breakthrough, the Segway has become relegated to odd niche uses. Historically, most technological innovation has led to a more environmentally destructive regime, and hence away from sustainability. With energy- and resource-saving and pollution-reducing technology increasingly available, the question is how to make its use routine. One framework is for such attempts to begin as niches, small, local experiments that pave the way for wider use.

Sabine Hielscher and her colleagues discuss community-led initiatives to adopt sustainable practices, contrasting them with larger, government- or corporate-led projects. An initiative such as a wind-farm typically has “minimal interactions with local communities and [is] implemented by ‘distant and closed institutions.’” By contrast, grassroots-community projects are often “based on a strong sense of social cohesion and trust”; they, therefore, seem more likely to spur deeper social change.

Nevertheless, institutional support at a larger level is also necessary to embed such practices. David Hess discusses how, in the transition to green energy, such social and institutional changes have been largely blocked, in the United States at least, by a counter-mobilization that has “reframed the green energy transition as without scientific basis, socialistic and too expensive at a time of economic hardship.” In addition, attempts to mitigate climate change cross purposes with current attempts at adaptation, as we might not have enough funds to pursue both at once. However, technologies exist that tackle both simultaneously, such as distributed renewable energy, which provides local power in the event of a disaster. Despite resistance, energy transitions are taking place, such as a cluster initiative in Worcester, Massachusetts discussed by Jennie Stephens and Stephen McCauley. Clustering uses geographic proximity to foster “collaborative learning, innovation and growth.” The Worcester project began in 2008 and has engaged government, grassroots organizations, and local businesses, a pairing of the cluster and niche strategies. Indeed, multiple strategies at all levels will be necessary in the push for a sustainability transition. Not just institutions, but minds, must change. As Stephens and McCauley argue, “individual and organizational choices are most likely to occur in the context of broader changes in values, lifestyles and cultural norms.”

Institutions must change, then, but so must hearts, and so must daily lives. Social practices theory lies somewhere between the poles of conventional thought that either posit the individual as autonomous master of her destiny, making rational decisions to advance her economic status, and the opposite idea that we are all victims of greater social forces that channel and control every aspect of our lives. Social practices theory, while starting with the idea that we are social beings acting according to the ideals of our group, does allow some agency for the individual to begin to create change. Nevertheless, Bente Halkier argues that “sustainable consumption patterns are predicated on the organization and conditions of the various relevant practices in people’s everyday lives.” Individual agency is channeled, first, by cultural assumptions, and second by infrastructure and technology.

Gert Spaargaren points out that traditional environmental proscriptions call for sacrifice, such as giving up meat or avoiding flying, so that “[t]o ‘do your bit’ means withdrawing from established behavioral routines that are fairly central to the everyday lives of major segments of the population.” Being an environmentalist seems like a punishment, engaged in only by a small group of green zealots. For a true transition, sustainable living must become part of everyday practice, normalized as the natural, and best, way of life. The transition must be both technological, in that the infrastructure must be present—for instance in a frequent, reliable network of public transit—and social, so that it seems like the routine way of life. Individuals and small groups, while socially channeled, can make a difference. For instance, people with “a source of inspiration—another family who mirrored their own choice to use sustainable transportation practices” are motivated to avoid excessive car reliance.

To show practice theory in action, Emily Kennedy and her colleagues describe two Canadian neighborhoods, one walkable and transit-oriented and the other suburban. In the latter, individual autonomy is limited, since “[t]he lack of visible alternatives to the vehicle...made those choosing sustainable transportation practices feel marginalized.” Social practices theory thus sees individuals “as carriers of practices, rather than as completely autonomous agents.” (As a somewhat marginalized environmental zealot myself, living in a neighborhood halfway between suburban and walkable/transit oriented, I can attest to this phenomenon. For instance, I feel a tinge of embarrassment when one of my students sees me waiting for a bus, rather than getting into my own car.) In their sample, however, Kennedy et al. found zero suburban residents without a car, while such a status was far more acceptable in the walkable/transit-oriented neighborhood. Their conclusion is that “urban design must be reconsidered if broad changes in sustainable transportation are to take place.” In this study, then, technology and infrastructure seem to trump social practices, or at least to decide what social practices are available.

Conversely, it seems to me, technology and infrastructure will never change without social change. This is because wider social preferences, along with activist pressure, are needed to alter our infrastructure, along with our daily habits. We had renewable energy in the 1970s, yet a combination of the availability of cheaper fuel, lack of political will, infrastructure lock-in, lobbying by the fossil-fuel industry, and inertia at the local level meant that it was never implemented. Hence our present crisis. Innovations in Sustainable Consumption discusses a plethora of interlocking ways to begin to move beyond it. Change is happening, but too slowly. Perhaps the volume will help stir discussion that leads to the breakthroughs we need.

Ethan Goffman is Associate Editor of Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy. His publications have appeared in E: The Environmental Magazine, Grist, and elsewhere. He is the author of Imagining Each Other: Blacks and Jews in Contemporary American Literature(State University of New York Press, 2000) and coeditor of The New York Public Intellectuals and Beyond (Purdue University Press, 2009) and Politics and the Intellectual: Conversations with Irving Howe (Purdue University Press, 2010). Ethan is a member of the Executive Committee of the Montgomery County (Maryland) Chapter of the Sierra Club.

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

Water, Water Everywhere and Not Enough to Drink (and Grow Food and Create Energy...)

Ethan Goffman

It is easy to get too obsessed with climate change as the predominant environmental issue and to neglect the complex interactions of deforestation, biodiversity loss, human population growth, ozone depletion, and numerous other factors. One key factor is water, upon which we all depend not just for drinking, but for agriculture, cleaning, energy generation, and ecosystem sustenance. The Thirsty Triangle: The Water Footprint of Energy Trade Between China, Canada, and the United States, a recent forum at the Woodrow Wilson Institute, reminded participants of H2O’s omnipresent role, suggesting that the water footprint could become as important as the carbon footprint for future energy projects.

Michael Hightower of Sandia National Laboratories called greenhouse-gas emissions “a very narrow indicator,” and suggested water will be part of a complex of factors for future decision making, that “we need to look at systems.” Using water footprinting as a major guidepost dramatically changes our energy future. Energy currently accounts for 8% of freshwater withdrawals. As aquifers are drawn down around the planet, conflict is growing around competing uses, and one of the uses is energy. Indeed, “water is becoming the Achilles heel of energy development,” said Hightower. He also emphasized how water availability will be affected by climate change, which is leading to a 10 to 20% reduction in precipitation. Furthermore, he worried about the cumulative impact of “droughts, floods, frequent storms, and snowcover shrinkage.” In the United States, he explained, we maxed out our surface-water potential around 1980 and have moved to groundwater, yet water tables are shrinking.

Energy development, then, will be dependent on water availability, which is regional and local. The current explosion of activity in the United States involving hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) will become much less tenable, as each drill site requires three to five million gallons of water. Since all water use is local, extraction will depend heavily on where a particular fracking site is located, how much water is available, and what other uses are competing for that water. Because shale reserves are greatest in areas facing water scarcity, Hightower pointed out, fracking’s future may be dim. Still, the use of brackish water rather than fresh could, to an extent, counteract that limitation. Nuclear plants, too, use a tremendous amount of water per Kilowatt hour, about twice as much as coal (depending on plant size and other factors), putting their future at risk. Biofuel use may be even more limited, as this crop-based energy source, like all agriculture, has an enormous water footprint. Another surprising result of the water dependency of contemporary forms of energy generation is the large amount needed for concentrated solar plants, planned for use in the southwestern part of the United States, as these are water cooled in an extremely dry region. (Not mentioned at the forum is the possibility of technological changes, such as the use of an alternative agent to water for fracking, biofuels grown in otherwise unusable water, or air-cooled concentrated solar). Examining the water footprint, then, substantiates the need for more investment in most forms of renewables, particularly wind, but also solar photovoltaic.

Steve Renzetti, Professor of Economics at Brock University, discussed the water situation in Canada, which uses a vast amount of hydroelectricity. He pointed out some good news, namely that water use is getting more efficient; water intensity has declined steadily since 1990. For example, water use per unit of agricultural output has fallen due to technological improvements. The same is true for oil and gas extraction. Nevertheless, Canada’s overall water demand is projected to increase. From 2005 to 2030, a 100% increase in water use for energy is expected, with a 50% increase for agriculture. However, because energy generation and agriculture are currently only 1% and 10% of water use respectively, the overall increase is relatively small. To further increase efficiency, Renzetti suggested a modest fee for water use, since water withdrawal today is largely free. Another huge problem is pollution, often due to agricultural runoff; Renzetti called nonpoint source pollution “a devil to regulate.” Lake Winnepeg, notably, has been so choked with algal blooms that Renzetti described it as “probably North America’s biggest untold environmental disaster.” Significant water degradation also comes from air pollution rained downed upon waterways, for instance from heavy metals, much of it from coal. Renzetti stressed the need for better baseline data and more regulation of nonpoint sources.

While the first two presentations covered North America, Qingwei Sun of Greenpeace China, discussed the water footprint as it pertains to the coal that powers China’s manufacturing boom. Indeed, the country is responsible for about half of global coal use, a key factor in the continuing rise in global greenhouse-gas emissions despite the lingering recession. The majority of China’s coal reserves are in the northwest, the most arid part of the country, which contains 83% of China’s coal reserves but only 25% of its water. Indeed, major coal producing provinces such as Inner Mongolia and Shanxi have used up their government-allocated water quotas and may experience insufficient water in five years.

The forum slighted trade issues, important for the “virtual water” included in any import or export product.  That is, each export of, say, potatoes, represents the amount of water needed to produce that commodity. Areas with excess water can thus “virtually” sell that water to areas with a deficit. Instead, the forum mainly discussed water use in a vacuum, as if each individual country had only its own water to depend on.

An exception is the selling of coal to China. This also means selling the water footprint of that coal. One would expect a growing amount of coal from North America, and coal imports into China are indeed surging, although currently the vast majority comes from other countries, specifically Indonesia. Nevertheless, American coal companies, which have been losing business to natural gas, are gearing up to replace it with exports to China. This could make opposing such exports the next big environmental issue in the United States. Yet Sun personally believes major shipment of North American coal to China will not happen, since Beijing is financing the construction of new north-south transport facilities, along with water pipelines, to keep its own coal flowing internally. This certainly makes sense in view the export-oriented policy of China, which seems loathe to become dependent on other countries. Still, the question remains whether the variety of demands for water will make it harder for China to continue exploiting its own coal at such an enormous rate. Perhaps it will be forced to turn to North America? On the other hand, China’s severe pollution, and the protests it is spurring, may push it to convert to renewable energy at an even faster rate than is currently the case, or even to slow its rate of growth and lead the country to seek a new definition of development. It is at least conceivable that China will become a proponent of development based on quality-of-life and long-term sustainability.

The water footprint, then, seems likely to channel future energy decisions, although local management and new technology can offset some of these limitations. Yet, to me at least, the issue of scale seems likely to force wiser management of water resources than of carbon emissions. Not only does suffering from excessive water use occur much sooner, but the same locations that make unwise decisions will suffer most from those decisions. Although we can expect some water shortage disasters at local, and even national levels, overall, circumstances are likely to compel relatively wise management of water. Climate change, by contrast, is a true tragedy of the commons, causing harm at a distance in both time and space. Of course, we will have to monitor and manage our water supplies with increasing care, but climate change still seems to me the more dangerous long-term problem, a seductive thief stealing our future.

Ethan Goffman is Associate Editor of Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy. His publications have appeared in E: The Environmental Magazine, Grist, and elsewhere. He is the author of Imagining Each Other: Blacks and Jews in Contemporary American Literature(State University of New York Press, 2000) and coeditor of The New York Public Intellectuals and Beyond (Purdue University Press, 2009) and Politics and the Intellectual: Conversations with Irving Howe (Purdue University Press, 2010). Ethan is a member of the Executive Committee of the Montgomery County (Maryland) Chapter of the Sierra Club.

Tuesday, May 7, 2013

Subsidizing Climate Change


Ethan Goffman
 
Countries around the world are subsidizing climate change, and other forms of environmental degradation, through energy subsidies. So explains Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications, a new report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Subsidies take many forms, from tax breaks for oil exploration to artificially low prices designed to help the poor. The report revealed that “on a―pre-tax basis, subsidies for petroleum products, electricity, natural gas, and coal reached $480 billion in 2011 (0.7 percent of global GDP).” Even worse, “on a post-tax basis—which also factors in the negative externalities from energy consumption—subsidies are much higher at $1.9 trillion (2.5 percent of global GDP).” The United States tops the list, with total subsidies worth $502 billion, with China a distant second, at $279 billion.

As an American citizen, it is especially infuriating that my country is such a bad actor here. True, President Obama has proposed eliminating fossil-fuel subsidies, but this has little chance of being enacted. It is easy enough to sit down and devise a scheme on paper to alter the situation, but the political realities of powerful special interests and a dysfunctional political system intrude. The IMF report explains that the current system is not actually a free market, and indeed distorts the functioning of the market, encouraging excessive use of artificially cheap energy and making it difficult for renewables to get off the ground. As the IMF puts it, “subsidies cause over-consumption of petroleum products, coal, and natural gas, and reduce incentives for investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy.” Subsidizing oil has other harmful effects, such as increasing traffic congestion. Eliminating subsidies is estimated to spur “a 13 percent decrease in global energy-related CO2 emissions,” as well as reducing local pollution.

One cannot, then, justify today’s energy system via free-market ideology, nor is it defensible from a good governance perspective. It is purely a manifestation of lock-in due to existing infrastructure in combination with lobbying by powerful players that benefit from subsidies. The IMF report also rebuffs those who would justify certain subsidies as helping the poor, explaining that the money would be better spent on public health and education: “Reallocating some of the resources freed by subsidy reform to more productive public spending could help boost growth over the long run.” In addition, energy subsidies tend to benefit the affluent, who use more energy. The report does recommend that removing subsidies for the poor should be done carefully, and perhaps gradually, to avoid short-term harm and a possible public backlash.

Implicit in the IMF report is a vision of sustainability that combines free markets with wise, if limited, government action. Some sustainability advocates will object that this is a weak position, that it ignores the need for an altered social contract in which growth and consumption cease to be central values. Nevertheless, following the prescriptions of the IMF will lead to far better outcomes than we have now. Since the report includes externalities in its “post-tax basis” estimate of $1.9 trillion in subsidies, this means ending the free pass that fossil-fuel interests—and consumers—have been given to pollute the environmental commons. In other words, those responsible for ecological degradation should be responsible for changing their ways. In still other words, a carbon tax is needed. And, since the report calls for public health and education, it implies the need for government intervention to help the poorest compete in a difficult world. This will help fulfill sustainability’s equity plank. (I would go a bit further, and say that it implicitly calls for greater equality of opportunity, although not equality of results.)

Although the IMF has long been criticized for neglecting the results of too much market liberalization with too few safeguards, perhaps this report signals that the organization may be taking some of the criticism seriously. Yet it also tends to discuss issues at a country level, while the problems are planet-wide, and to laud growth as good, provided it is done with clean technology. The report does offer many useful suggestions for implementing change, such as planning ahead with a clear strategy, being open and transparent, and phasing in reforms systematically. A bolder approach would call for an international carbon tax, along with stronger international environmental standards, rather than sticking to a country-by-country approach. When, for instance, Chinese air pollution drifts into South Korea—or Los Angeles—who is held responsible?

The problem is that organizations such as the IMF have long advocated free trade in the face of weak system of international governance. This is somewhat akin to the existence of a European fiscal union absent stronger governmental ties, or a sense of responsibility of one country for another, which has led to economic disaster. Similarly, globalization without strong environmental and labor standards has led, for instance, to massive pollution in China as it seeks economic growth regardless of consequences. Unfettered globalization can also be blamed for lower labor standards, leading, for instance, to the recent garment factory fire in Bangladesh as that country struggles to compete internationally. A stronger global governance system is needed for globalization to benefit the majority of Earth’s people.

It is also true, however, that poverty around the world has been shrinking (in percentage if not in raw numbers, as the population grows) (World Bank, 2011). Globalization and shared technology have increased the size of the economic pie, and evened the geographic distribution of wealth, as its advocates have long argued. Yet it has also enriched a small global elite at a disproportionate level, while lowering labor and environmental safeguards (TheRulesOrg, 2013). It is not sustainable. The recommendations in the IMF report provide an excellent start to reform, but might prove too piecemeal and local. A comprehensive, international approach is needed. Alas, global governance institutions, as currently constituted, lack the strong democratic basis and legitimacy for such an undertaking.

Ethan Goffman is Associate Editor of Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy. His publications have appeared in E: The Environmental Magazine, Grist, and elsewhere. He is the author of Imagining Each Other: Blacks and Jews in Contemporary American Literature(State University of New York Press, 2000) and coeditor of The New York Public Intellectuals and Beyond (Purdue University Press, 2009) and Politics and the Intellectual: Conversations with Irving Howe (Purdue University Press, 2010). Ethan is a member of the Executive Committee of the Montgomery County (Maryland) Chapter of the Sierra Club.